Destroying Hitler’s Berghof: The Bomber Command Raid of 25 April 1945 by Haller, Oliver
Canadian Military History
Volume 20 | Issue 1 Article 2
4-30-2012
Destroying Hitler’s Berghof: The Bomber
Command Raid of 25 April 1945
Oliver Haller
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military
History by an authorized editor of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact scholarscommons@wlu.ca.
Recommended Citation
Haller, Oliver (2011) "Destroying Hitler’s Berghof: The Bomber Command Raid of 25 April 1945," Canadian Military History: Vol. 20
: Iss. 1 , Article 2.
Available at: http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol20/iss1/2
5Abstract: This paper examines the 
Royal Air Force raid on Adolf Hitler’s 
Berghof on the Obersalzberg in 
April 1945. Arthur Harris, the head 
of Bomber Command, wanted to 
emphasize air power’s decisive 
role in the defeat of  Nazism. 
However, Winston Churchill and 
Bernard  Montgomer y,  among 
others, questioned the usefulness 
of destroying Berchtesgaden so 
late in the war. Unlike traditional 
explanations that focus on post-
D r e s d e n  g u i l t ,  t h i s  a r t i c l e 
contends that British politicians 
grew increasingly concerned with 
the economic state of postwar 
Germany and the potential costs 
of the upcoming occupation. The 
continuation of area bombing at this 
late stage of the war reinforced the 
fears and consequences of “overkill.” 
Harris’s disconnect with postwar 
civil-military concerns negatively 
influenced the postwar image of 
Bomber Command.
Introduction
Adolf Hitler celebrated his final birthday in a concrete crypt 
at the end of April 1945. The reach 
of enemy firepower had forced 
him underground to escape an 
approaching firestorm that had been 
fuelled by years of hatred, suffering 
and death. Soviet artillery was well 
within range of the city and the shells 
of over 40,000 guns began further 
reducing a heavily bombed city to 
ashes. Some of those who remained at 
the dictator’s side already referred to 
the bunker beside the chancellery as 
the “mortuary” or as a “show house 
of living corpses.”1 On 25 April 1945, 
Soviet armour and infantry pushed 
through the few remaining German 
defensive lines and encircled Berlin.
 Other historic events on that 
day underscored the totality of Nazi 
defeat. An American lieutenant from 
the 69th Infantry Division met with a 
small group of Soviet soldiers near the 
German town of Torgau on the banks 
of the Elbe in northwestern Saxony. 
Hitler’s rapidly shrinking empire 
had been cut in two. Journalists 
understood the implications and 
rushed proclamations of “victory” 
into print.2 On the same day that 
Soviet and American troops shook 
hands at Torgau, the delegates of 50 
countries met in San Francisco to form 
the United Nations. “Nothing is more 
essential to the future peace of the 
world,” Harry S. Truman remarked, 
“than continued cooperation of the 
nations which had to muster the force 
necessary to defeat the conspiracy 
of the Axis powers to dominate the 
world.”3 A new world was already 
taking shape as the curtain fell on 
Nazism. A few days later, Hitler’s 
gasoline-soaked corpse burned in a 
ditch.
 A fourth major event on 25 
April has largely gone unnoticed 
by historians and is consequently 
r a r e l y  a c k n o w l e d g e d  t o d a y . 
A large force of Avro Lancaster 
heavy bombers and DeHavilland 
Mosquito light bombers left England 
to attack Hitler’s mountain retreat in 
Obersalzberg near Berchtesgaden. 
His Berghof represented one of the 
most evocative symbols of Nazism 
and of the international community’s 
failure to grasp opportunities to stop 
Hitler prior to German rearmament. 
Journalists revelled in the payback 
– even if belated – of the Berghof’s 
destruction. Unfortunately for 
Bomber Command’s image, even 
though headlines such as “Hitler’s 
Chalet Wrecked” triumphantly 
celebrated a kind of victory, the RAF’s 
efforts that day have subsequently 
been portrayed by historians in an 
anticlimactic manner if at all.4
 It was simply “intolerable” to 
Bomber Command, Max Hastings 
writes in a couple of sentences 
devoted to the raid, to “sit out the 
last weeks of the war in idleness.”5 
Considering the British devotion to 
“rubble bouncing” at the end of the 
war, the decision to bomb Hitler’s 
retreat must certainly have been 
motivated by more than boredom. 
At the time, journalists offered three 
basic reasons. First, the bombing was 
simply “business as usual” in that the 
operation continued the systematic 
destruction of industrial, military 
and government facilities. Journalists 
reported that this raid had the special 
and laudable objective of decapitating 
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6the Nazi state by physically removing 
Hitler. A third explanation added 
that Bomber Command wanted 
to prevent the construction of an 
“Alpine Redoubt” for a last stand by 
German forces with the defensive 
advantages of mountainous terrain. 
Journalists as well as a large number 
of Allied military officers were 
gripped by nearly “hysterical fears 
of a never-ending partisan war on 
German soil.”6
 In revisiting the events of the 
raid, the present article evaluates 
these three explanations and suggests 
a fourth: by striking directly at 
the hated Nazi leader, Bomber 
Command was endeavouring to 
change its image as a blunt weapon 
of terror. It is clear that Air Chief 
Marshal Arthur Harris, commander-
in-chief of Bomber Command, feared 
that politicians such as Winston 
Churchill had misinterpreted the 
destruction of cities such as Dresden 
or Pforzheim as excessive force 
bordering on barbarism. Churchill’s 
attempt at distancing himself from 
the bombing campaign is a familiar 
theme in analyses of this period. It is 
the intention here to point out that 
the destruction of Hitler’s Berghof, 
as described by press accounts based 
on information provided by the 
military, tried to remind everyone 
that the defeat of Nazism had been 
the overriding aim of the war over 
Germany. Unfortunately for Harris, 
a single raid could not possibly 
change hardening opinions that 
his lack of political acumen had 
cultivated. Decades of acrimonious 
debate concerning the effectiveness 
and morality of strategic bombing 
followed.
Strategic Bombing in 1945
The Combined Bomber Offensive was effectively over at the start of 
April 1945. The chief of the air staff, 
Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, 
understood that the area bombing 
of industrial cities could no longer 
influence the war’s outcome. He 
requested an end to the strategic air 
war on 1 April. At “this advanced 
stage of the war,” he admitted in a later 
note to Winston Churchill, “no great 
or immediate additional advantage 
can be expected from the attack of 
the remaining industrial centres 
of Germany.”7 Portal nevertheless 
listed a number of cases where the 
bombers might still be used. These 
exceptions included strikes against 
“communications systems” and 
preventing the formation of centres 
of resistance and in particular a 
“redoubt in Southern Germany.” The 
continued determination to use bombs 
to encourage German surrender, one 
of the primary goals established at the 
Casablanca Conference of 1943, did 
not signify a stop to the destruction 
of urban infrastructure or the killing 
of civilians.
 Government officials reacted to 
the inevitability of victory and the 
continuation of Anglo-American 
bombing efforts in a different 
manner and from a far different 
perspective. Ever since the expulsion 
of German military forces from 
Normandy at the end of August 
1944, various political agencies had 
expended considerable energy on 
establishing a framework for the 
postwar reconstruction of Europe 
that included the administration of 
a conquered Germany. Churchill 
agreed with the general Foreign Office 
view that Europe would benefit from 
a balanced policy that recognized 
the “importance of the contribution 
which German industry could make 
to the rehabilitation of Europe and 
to world prosperity.”8 At Yalta in 
February 1945, Churchill battled 
against the more punitive demands 
of Franklin D. Roosevelt and Joseph 
Stalin in order to safeguard German 
industry and thereby reduce the costs 
of occupation on British taxpayers. 
At the end of the month, Churchill 
summarized these discussions and 
openly declared his stance on German 
industry to the House of Commons.9 
Most politicians, including Roosevelt 
and Stalin, understood that the 
destruction of industrial assets 
needed for reconstruction or at least 
as part of a reparations settlement 
made no economic or humanitarian 
sense at all.
 Churchill grew increasingly 
hostile to a bombing strategy that 
called his postwar policy into 
question. After the destruction of 
Dresden in mid-February, he sent 
a minute (later revised to remove 
the word “terror”) to the Chiefs of 
Staff urging a review of the bombing 
offensive:
It seems to me that the moment has 
come when the question of bombing 
of German cities simply for the sake 
of increasing the terror, though under 
other pretexts, should be reviewed. 
Otherwise we shall come into control 
of an utterly ruined land. We shall 
not, for instance be able to get 
housing materials out of Germany 
for our own needs because some 
temporary provision would have to 
be made for the Germans themselves. 
The destruction of Dresden remains 
a serious query against the conduct 
of the Allied bombing. I am of the 
opinion that military objectives 
must henceforward be more strictly 
studied in our own interests rather 
than that of the enemy.10
Bomber Command reacted in a 
myopic manner characteristic of 
an institution blinded by undue 
concentration on operational goals at 
the expense of larger perspectives. “I 
do not personally regard the whole 
of the remaining cities of Germany,” 
Harris responded, “as worth the 
bones of one British grenadier.”11 
German cities did, however, matter 
in the kind of stable postwar world 
Anglo-American politicians wanted 
to create. It is therefore surprising 
that some historians share Bomber 
Command’s  perspect ive  and 
attribute Churchill’s shift to legacy 
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7issues to shock or even felicitous 
pandering to increasingly hostile 
public opinion.12 Churchill’s focus 
during the month of February 
expressed a real fear that the bombers 
were tearing to pieces infrastructure 
needed for the postwar recovery.
 More politically astute than 
Harris,  Portal  had decided to 
find middle ground by restricting 
what was left of strategic bombing 
doctrine to what Robert A. Pape 
calls a “punishment strategy…
harming enemy civilians in order 
to lower their morale and motivate 
them to force their governments to 
end the war.”13 Targeting industry 
made little sense. On 6 April, Portal 
repeated Churchill’s warning that 
the further destruction of German 
cities would only complicate the 
future occupation.14 This point was 
understood by most of the officers 
who assembled at the SHAEF 
headquarters in Reims at the start of 
the month to discuss target selection. 
The physical seizure of German 
territory by Allied ground forces and 
the actual or imminent overrunning 
of the enemy’s few remaining centres 
of industrial production weighed on 
their minds. The American strategists 
understood that the strategic bombing 
campaign was over. General Carl A. 
Spaatz, commander of US Strategic 
Air Forces in Europe, called for 
an end to operations and ordered 
his heavy bombers to work more 
closely with the tactical air forces to 
assist the men on the ground. Harris 
disagreed. Even though he lamented 
that his Lancasters and Halifaxes 
“had practically no more targets 
left,” he curiously refused to accept 
victory and instead wracked his brain 
in order to come up with methods 
of avoiding tactical missions.15 
Supreme Commander General 
Dwight D. Eisenhower, having seen 
the destruction in Germany with his 
own eyes, tried to force Harris into 
compliance by transferring the full 
weight of Allied air power against 
what remained of the Wehrmacht 
and the enemy’s communications 
system. His last formal strategic 
bombing directive in mid-April 
repeated the demand that the heavy 
bombers support the ground forces 
in the final thrusts into Germany. To 
ensure compliance with this decision, 
Eisenhower reminded the Strategic 
Targets Committee that their tasks 
were restricted to target selection and 
not setting overall policy.16 Harris 
maintained defiance.
 In fairness, Harris had consistently 
pushed a unique bombing agenda 
that had no use for moral facades. 
He had accepted the brutal nature of 
modern warfare and often showed 
a sophisticated understanding of 
industrialized economies. The air 
marshal’s support of area bombing 
deviated considerably from the 
American adoption of precision 
bombing. Based on the work of the 
Air Corps Tactical School during 
the 1930s,  American bombing 
strategy called for the disruption 
of an enemy’s industrial system by 
targeting and destroying the flow of 
essential commodities such as ball-
bearings or fuel. Once this aim was 
The Combined Bomber Offensive was effectively over at the beginning of April, but RAF Bomber Command continued 
to strike targets in Germany. Here, a Bomber Command Avro Lancaster conducts a daylight raid on Germany in 1945.
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8achieved, it was argued, the output of 
a stretched wartime economy would 
plummet. Harris dismissed the central 
hypothesis of American industrial 
suppression that formed the heart of 
daylight bombing against Germany 
after 1942. Large modern industrial 
economies retained significant 
flexibility based on immense dormant 
dual-use capacities that could be 
mobilized when needed. Bomber 
Command learned early in the war 
that only the aggregate destruction 
of major German cities within a 
particular industrial region such as 
Hamburg could suppress output in 
any meaningful sense. The American 
attempt at halting ball-bearing 
production at Schweinfurt in 1943, 
for example, failed to acknowledge 
the ability to draw on stocks, develop 
alternatives or even buy replacements 
from neutral states or brutally exploit 
the occupied territories. Even though 
many treatments of British strategy 
after the war have criticized Harris 
for failing to accept American 
doctrine and thereby concentrate 
almost exclusively on synthetic fuel 
and transportation targets, a strategy 
that ultimately paralyzed the German 
economic and military system, 
this criticism is based largely on a 
misunderstanding.17 The aggregate 
reduction of German cities eroded 
the overall output of a wide range 
of dual-use commodities needed 
for every aspect of the economy 
including synthetic fuel. The wide 
dispersal of thousands of small, 
medium and large firms throughout 
cities such as Berlin meant that 
only area bombing acknowledged 
the actual dimensions and nature 
of modern industrial economies. 
Left top: This photo, taken by a US 
9th Air Force P-51 scout pilot, shows 
a group of American B-24s attacking 
the German city of Nordhausen on 11 
April 1945.
Left below: An aerial view of the bomb 
damaged city of Nordhausen taken on 
12 May 1945.
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9In many ways, especially when it 
is considered that the Germans on 
the ground did not often perceive 
of clear differences between area 
and precision bombing,18 the air 
marshal’s strategy was neither wrong 
nor misguided. The image of Bomber 
Command suffered in part because 
of the organization’s effectiveness 
against an industrial infrastructure 
that could not easily be separated into 
military and civilian components.19
 Bomber Command’s target 
selection during April demonstrated 
a spirit  of  business as usual . 
Operations during the initial week 
of that month flattened cities such 
as Nordhausen. Harris officially 
proclaimed the need to dislocate 
the enemy political apparatus by 
destroying administrative buildings 
and to weaken military effectiveness 
by torching barracks.  Due to 
poor bombing accuracy despite 
significantly improved capabilities, 
most of the buildings targeted 
survived unscathed and a majority 
of the bombs fell on residential 
areas instead.20 Sadly, concentration 
camp inmates working at the Dora 
underground facilities producing V-2s 
were also killed. While a legitimate 
military target, the bombing of 
Nordhausen, which was occupied 
shortly thereafter, indicated a strong 
disregard for political concerns 
by Bomber Command. Politicians 
could hardly understand any need 
to further dislocate a disintegrating 
enemy. In any case, the kinds of 
buildings targeted were needed by 
the future occupation authorities in 
order to house military personnel. 
Since strategic operations were 
suspended that week for precisely 
this reason, it was also apparent that 
Harris unknowingly worked against 
future Allied interests.
 Although for different reasons, 
other cities fared equally poorly 
after Harris switched to operations 
the command justified as necessary 
for tactical support of the ground 
forces.  Aircrew released their 
bombs over Leipzig on 10 April, 
Nuremberg and Bayreuth on 11 
April and Potsdam on 15 April. 
The Dresden-Leipzig-Halle and 
Halle-Nuremberg rail lines, Harris 
claimed, were critically important for 
the movement of men and material. 
The choice of Potsdam, however, 
shows that these selections permitted 
the continuation of orthodox area 
bombing strategy under the cloak of 
tactical requirements. The Potsdam 
raid was more indicative of Harris’ 
stubborn faith in air power as a 
decisive weapon owing to his 
wartime obsession with the levelling 
of the Berlin region as a way to knock 
Germany out of the war – the so-
called elusive “knockout blow.”21
 The Potsdam raid, the last of over 
300 attacks against the capital and 
surrounding area during the war, 
attempted to vindicate his strategic 
outlook that the “wiping out” of 
German cities was “an end in itself.”22 
Harris had sponsored a number 
of large operations that aimed at 
levelling Berlin and its suburbs, 
Germany’s largest urban area, and 
inflicting prohibitive casualties in 
the hundreds of thousands.23 In 
April, Harris ignored Churchill’s 
request to stand down and instead 
pushed strongly for the destruction of 
Potsdam (along with Berchtesgaden) 
at the Air Commanders Conference 
on 12 April. Field Marshal Bernard 
Montgomery, the Deputy Supreme 
Commander, expressed doubts 
that the marshalling yards and 
barracks of either city constituted 
important targets of any real value 
at that point in the war. In any 
case, the field marshal also feared 
that the bombing of targets along 
the Soviet line of advance might 
now carry serious political and 
military repercussions. Pressing 
tactical concerns, Harris convinced 
a reluctant Portal to authorize the 
operation. The destruction of Potsdam 
that followed, notable for the loss of 
the baroque “Garnisonkirche” and 
not the interdiction of German traffic, 
resulted in the suspension of these 
kinds of operations a day later.24 From 
Churchill’s perspective, the bombing 
of Potsdam demonstrated yet another 
act of unwarranted destruction. He 
asked: “What was the point of going 
and blowing down Potsdam.”25 
Instead of recognizing that these 
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Photograph taken in August 1945.
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kinds of raids might work against the 
image of Bomber Command, Harris 
turned his attention to Berchtesgaden 
and the Berghof.
The Decision to Bomb 
the Obersalzberg
Mid-April witnessed the effective collapse of German resistance. 
Soviet forces breached the Oder 
River and surrounded Berlin by 25 
April. The Anglo-American advance 
into Germany helps illustrate a clear 
problem concerning the area bombing 
of Nordhausen, Leipzig or Potsdam. 
On 7 March, the Western power’s 
armies had crossed the Rhine in force. 
Twenty-one German divisions were 
bypassed and encircled in the Ruhr. 
By 11 April, infantry and armour 
had penetrated as far as Magdeburg 
only 60 miles from Berlin. American 
soldiers reached Nuremberg deep in 
southern Germany on 16 April and 
Leipzig was captured three days 
later. Resistance in the Ruhr pocket 
dissolved and the commanding 
officer, Field Marshal Walter Model, 
perhaps thinking of his complicity 
in atrocities on the eastern front or 
in terms of accepted behaviour for 
a man of his rank, shot himself in 
the head on 21 April. Area bombing 
operations against cities that would 
almost certainly be captured within 
days therefore hardly made any sense 
at all. If operations had aimed instead 
at fulfilling the SHAEF demand to 
stop the retreating Germans by the 
tactical application of air power, 
excessive damage could have been 
mitigated.26
 In any case, the bombers operated 
under conditions vastly different to 
those of 1943 or even 1944. In the war’s 
final months, the daily availability of 
bomber aircraft reached the highest 
levels of the war. Bomber Command 
could throw 1,609 bombers against 
Germany – including 353 Halifaxes, 
1,087 Lancasters and 203 Mosquitos. 
Almost one-quarter of this strength 
would participate in the Berghof 
operation.27 German air opposition 
had also virtually collapsed. German 
piston-engine a ircraf t  ceased 
operations against the western Allies 
after a last desperate effort on 7 April. 
Prodded forward by the “strains of 
martial music over the radio,” 120 
German aircraft intercepted American 
bomber formations and “attempted a 
mass suicide ramming operation 
at immense expense.” Thereafter, 
what remained of the Luftwaffe was 
ordered to face the Soviet advance 
and only 200 jet fighters were left to 
fend off over 9,000 Anglo-American 
heavy bombers alone.28
 These thousands of bombers were 
unleashed against communications 
under near perfect conditions with 
experienced aircrews that now had 
An aerial view of Hitler’s retreat, four miles east of the railyards in the town of Berchtesgaden. This photo 
was taken in February 1945 before the area was bombed. 1: The Wachenfels or Berghof, Hitler’s housing 
complex; 2: SS Barracks; 3: the Platterhof hotel; 4: Martin Bormann’s house.
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the technological capacities of hitting 
with exceptional accuracy. US Eighth 
Air Force flew 3,946 sorties against 
transportation targets over the 10-
day period starting on 16 April. 
Bomber Command contributed with 
622 sorties. Of course, the list of even 
these tactical targets shrank by the 
hour. The contracting Reich squeezed 
what remained of rail movement 
into an increasingly small area. 
Much of this traffic was focused on 
Munich and Salzburg. The number 
of locomotives operating in the 
region doubled under increasingly 
oppressive conditions. The trains 
simply had nowhere else to go 
after American bombers struck the 
marshalling yards of Regensburg, 
Dresden, Munich and Salzburg. 
Railway lines were cut, rolling stock 
was damaged and bridges were 
brought down or made impassable. 
Mustering all of the skills developed 
during the war, including feint attacks 
and window and mandrel screens, 
Bomber Command contributed with 
additional strikes against the cities 
of Pilsen, Schwandorf, Cham and 
Komothau. The southern German 
infrastructure could no longer cope 
with the weight of traffic and enemy 
ordnance. A 14,000-car jam near 
Munich developed that was not 
cleared until June 1945.29
 It could be argued that the 25 
April raid against Berchtesgaden was 
ostensibly part of the same tactical 
operations. However, since the 
city represented the end of the rail 
line, with traffic travelling through 
Salzburg instead, this hypothesis 
lacks credibility. The matter of 
the “Alpine Redoubt” represents 
another and more complicated 
issue. A number of authorities 
such as the American Office of 
Strategic Services were convinced 
by Nazi propaganda that fed their 
analysts’ own assumptions that the 
German high command intended 
to concentrate what remained of 
their armies in the Alps in order 
to wage a desperate defence in the 
mountains. An initially unwilling 
Hitler had ordered the creation of 
an alpine fortress in mid-March 
1945. The Berghof had access to a 
communications centre equal to those 
bordering Berlin Zossen. Hitler’s 
frequent visits to the Berghof had 
demanded extensive development 
to enable communication between 
the dictator and his armies. German 
labourers  worked for  several 
weeks to expand the fortifications 
around Hitler’s resort and stockpile 
armaments, ammunition and food. 
The inner core of the Nazi party 
expected Hitler to leave the capital 
prior to Soviet encirclement.30 Hitler, 
however, never seriously entertained 
the redoubt concept. The dictator 
had decided to stand or fall in Berlin. 
Party Secretary Martin Bormann 
summed up Hitler’s viewpoint 
with the observation that any south 
German military defence could not 
survive the capitulation of Berlin 
for long. The factories of the capital 
were responsible for a significant 
percentage of overall armament 
production. Hitler decided to remain 
in the German capital to fortify the 
willpower of the few men and boys 
left to fight his last battle.31 On 22 
April, he announced that he would 
stay in Berlin.32
 In any case, the Allied fear of an 
Alpine redoubt was partly built on 
the hard fighting experienced in the 
mountains and hills of Italy and the 
fact that the enemy’s forces from all 
fronts seemed to be headed towards 
the Alps. A document from the 
Luftwaffe operations staff dated 27 
April 1945 later appeared to confirm 
these fears. The report advocated 
the creation of a “final bulwark of 
fanatical resistance.” The Luftwaffe 
High Command or OKL called for 
the area to be sealed off, the transfer 
of the maximum possible quantities 
of military supplies, the creation of 
industrial plant to supply the soldiers, 
and even the creation of airfields. 
“They were in a position to withdraw 
straight into the southern face of the 
Redoubt,” the RAF Italian campaign 
narrative records, “retaining, at any 
rate for a time, the food-producing 
and industrial area of Northern 
Italy.” The redoubt would have a 
perimeter of approximately 400 miles 
with Berchtesgaden acting as the 
“nerve centre.” The advantages of 
Allied air superiority, it was pointed 
out, would have been lost in the 
mountains and Allied attempts to 
take control of the Alps would have 
carried the risk of significant losses.33
 On 21 March,  the German 
Chief of the Air Staff General 
Koller transferred elements of his 
staff to both Berchtesgaden and 
Thumersbach near Zell am See in 
Austria. Ritter von Greim, Hermann 
Göring and approximately 90 officers 
later surrendered to the Americans 
at Thumersbach.34 This transfer of 
Luftwaffe staff to Berchtesgaden, 
seemed to RAF analysts to foreshadow 
the establishment of a redoubt. 
Considering that the German military 
had nowhere else to go and that 
Berchtesgaden’s infrastructure 
already made the area the natural 
replacement headquarters for Zossen, 
RAF concerns regarding a redoubt 
took on skewed – almost wishful 
– thinking. They even disregarded 
radio broadcasts that announced 
Hitler’s firm determination to hold 
Berlin against the Soviet advance.35
 Even though the American 
OSS had initially helped raise the 
spectre of an Alpine Redoubt, the 
Americans opposed the bombing 
of Berchtesgaden and did not share 
the views expressed by Harris.36 
T h e  b u n k e r  s y s t e m s  o n  t h e 
Obersalzberg were cut deeply into 
the mountainside. Similar raids on 
Monte Cassino in Italy and especially 
Caen in Normandy had furthermore 
already demonstrated the limitations 
of air power. The destruction of 
Caen on 7 July 1944 reduced the city 
to more easily defensible rubble; 
Max Hastings points out that “this 
action came to be regarded as one 
of the most futile air attacks of the 
7
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war.”37 Bomber Command failed to 
offer evidence concerning how the 
destruction of Hitler’s house or even 
the railway station would hinder the 
erection of a defensive perimeter.
 In terms of the journalistic 
accounts issued after the raid, it 
is painfully obvious that none of 
Bomber Command’s stated aims have 
the slightest credibility. Regarding 
the tactical neutralization of enemy 
communications, Berchtesgaden 
represented the end of a minor 
railway line and perhaps one of the 
most insignificant rail targets left 
in the Reich. In terms of any effort 
at decapitating the Nazi state, all 
available evidence indicated that 
Hitler remained in Berlin on the other 
side of Germany. It is furthermore 
unclear how Harris thought even 
the largest bombs could cut into the 
mountain in order to either kill top 
Nazi or military officials or even 
destroy valuable infrastructure. The 
RAF’s final mission clearly must have 
been formulated with something else 
in mind.
The Obersalzberg Raid
Bomber Command engaged in two major operations on 25 April 
1945. In addition to bombing Hitler’s 
alpine retreat, the heavy bombers 
were sent on a tactical mission in 
support of the ground forces. The 
target was the island of Wangerooge 
near Bremen. The British had learned 
at Antwerp that coastal artillery 
could interfere with shipping and 
keep port facilities closed. British 
troops had just reached Bremen and 
required the large port installations to 
take pressure off of Antwerp. A total 
of 308 Halifaxes, 158 Lancasters and 
16 Mosquitos exploited clear weather, 
flat terrain and the proximity of 
the targets to the shoreline, which 
simplified aiming, to saturate the 
coastal artillery emplacements with 
explosives. Six aircraft were lost but 
the raid was hailed a success.38
 The Obersalzberg raid was 
different. The Lancasters struck 
two primary targets that had no 
defensive purpose or capability. 
The first British target was the 
Kehlsteinhaus. Referred to by the 
Allies as the “Eagle’s Nest,” it was a 
chalet-style pavilion on a 1800-metre 
peak with a spectacular view built 
for Hitler to entertain dignitaries 
and guests. The small building 
represented a real test of British 
capabilities. Oboe, the British aerial 
blind bombing targeting system, 
had an error radius of roughly 100 
metres. Hitting something this small 
depended on a bit of luck. The second 
target was considerably larger. The 
Wachenfels or Berghof, Hitler’s 
housing complex, sat on the rim of 
the village of Obersalzberg. Located 
two miles east of Berchtesgaden, 
the target area contained Hitler’s 
residence as well as those of other 
Nazi officials, a hospital, a garage 
and barracks for the SS guards. The 
Berghof itself measured roughly 837 
by 380 metres.39
 Aircraft unable to bomb Hitler’s 
alpine retreat were ordered to 
release their bombs over a number 
of secondary targets including the 
bridges in Salzburg. In accordance 
with SHAEF orders, that major 
city represented the focal point 
of a series of tactically-oriented 
bombing raids. The Americans also 
bombed communications targets in 
Traunstein, Reichenhall, Salzburg, 
Hallein, and Freilasing – all within 
close proximity to the Obersalzberg. 
These strikes resulted in over 300 
A strike photo taken during the Royal Air Force attack on the island of Wangerooge 
on 25 April 1945. Two aircraft, a Halifax above and a Lancaster underneath, cross the 
target area with bomb doors open, while explosions obscure the ground below.
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civilian deaths and caused significant 
damage to rail stations, hospitals 
and infrastructure such as gasworks. 
Bomber Command therefore seemed 
once again destined to participate on 
the fringes of an American operation 
that made far more military sense.40
 Bomber Command sent 359 
Lancasters from 22 squadrons to add 
Hitler to the long list of “bombed 
out” Germans – those who lost their 
homes and were forced into shelters. 
The aircrews were composed of an 
international group of 2,529 men 
from England, Australia, Rhodesia, 
Canada and Poland. The operational 
experience of these men ranged 
from old hands to those flying their 
first mission. Another 16 Mosquitos 
accompanied the “heavies” to assist 
the raid by guiding the Lancasters onto 
the target using Oboe. Furthermore, 
a significant number of fighters were 
also ordered to protect the bomber 
streams from the now slight danger 
of interdiction by German fighters. 
Aircraft from 13 squadrons of RAF 
Fighter Command and 98 Mustangs 
of the US Eighth Air Force flew as 
escorts.41
 The bomber crews could expect 
near-ideal conditions when they took 
off from 19 different bases in England 
on the morning of 25 April. The escort 
fighters themselves out-numbered 
the 200 operational fighters available 
to the Luftwaffe. Fighters were not 
scrambled, and the small number 
of German jet fighters on patrol 
failed to intercept the bombers. 
Flying at roughly 320 kilometres per 
hour, the mass of aircraft headed 
towards Paris, flying over friendly 
territory, and then turned towards 
Germany. The bombers reached the 
target between 0900 and 1000 hours. 
Because of the shrinking size of the 
Reich, the time spent over enemy 
territory in range of flak batteries was 
brief. The weather conditions over 
the target appeared equally positive. 
Only minimal amounts of snow and 
mist on the ground obscured the 
Obersalzberg. The Obersalzberg 
anti-aircraft artillery defences were 
relatively light considering the 
political importance of the area. 
Bomber Command recorded only 
minor but accurate anti-aircraft 
fire. A large number of bombs were 
therefore dropped onto the two 
targets under good conditions. About 
1,232 tons of ordnance fell on the 
Obersalzberg. This load included 
the last six-ton “Tallboys” of the 
war dropped by 16 Lancasters of 617 
Squadron. The bombers then turned 
towards Belgium and returned 
largely unmolested to England 
by 1200 to 1400 hours. The war 
diary records that the bombing was 
“accurate and effective” and that only 
two Lancasters were lost.42
 It is necessary to examine this dry 
comment more closely. First of all, 
most of the squadrons involved in the 
two operations flew their last sorties. 
All combat deaths during the final 
days of a conflict somehow appear 
the most tragic. The first Lancaster 
was manned by aircrew from the 
Australian No.460 Squadron. The 
squadron itself was believed to have 
dropped the greatest tonnage of 
bombs of any in Bomber Command, 
or roughly 24,000 tons, during the 
war. It had also suffered some of the 
highest loss rates; 169 Wellingtons 
and Lancasters failed to return home. 
This particular aircraft, on its first 
mission, was seriously damaged by 
flak . Engine power was cut. In the 
attempt to leave the aircraft, one of the 
men’s parachutes opened inside the 
aircraft. The pilot remained at his post 
and executed a “dead-stick” landing 
to save the trapped man’s life. The 
plane crash-landed near Traunstein 
about 50 kilometres northwest of 
Berchtesgaden. Fortunate not to 
suffer any casualties, the airmen 
were captured and moved to various 
prisoner of war camps. The speed of 
the Allied advance meant that they 
were soon liberated. Several men 
were freed within four days.43
 The other Lancaster’s story 
was less fortunate. Several aircraft 
were moderately damaged by the 
German guns and yet continued 
back to England. Another aircraft 
was diverted to Paris as a precaution. 
But German flak destroyed a bomber 
from No.619 Squadron. The crew 
was relatively experienced by 
the standards of the day. They 
had participated in a number of 
operations beginning in December 
1944. These included raids against 
such cities as Heilbronn and Politz 
in Germany. They also participated 
in the disastrous 5 January 1945 raid 
against the French coastal city of 
Royan that killed between 500 and 
The Kehlsteinhaus, also known as Hitler’s “Eagle’s Nest,” sits atop an 1800 metre peak 
in the Obersaltzberg. It was a prime target in the 25 April raid but emerged unscathed.
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800 French civilians. Shot down by 
the German antiaircraft defences, the 
plane hit the earth near Hallein about 
10 kilometres north of Berchtesgaden. 
Four airmen died. Three survived 
and were taken prisoner. Like their 
compatriots, they were soon freed 
and returned to England in May 
1945.44
The Raid’s Results
What did the Obersalzberg raid achieve? A lone German Arado 
234 jet reconnaissance bomber was 
intercepted by P-51s and destroyed. 
The pilot successfully bailed out and 
survived. The pathfinders, however, 
faced an obstacle more daunting 
than fighter harassment. Nature itself 
stood in the way of the specialist 
aircraft. Flight Lieutenant John 
Sampson, who flew a Mosquito IX 
of No.105 Squadron, stated that 
none of the Oboe marking aircraft 
succeeded on 25 April. Subsequent 
analys is  es tabl ished that  the 
mountains blocked the release signal 
at the critical moment even though 
the British aircraft flew at close to 
12,000 metres altitude. Furthermore, 
photographs taken by the Lancaster 
crews indicate that intense smoke 
quickly obscured the targets. The 
marking of Hitler’s “Eagle’s Nest” 
and residence proved difficult.45
 The initial reports pointed out 
that the Lancasters had generally 
missed their targets. The “Eagle’s 
Nest” escaped completely unscathed. 
Not even the “Tallboys” managed to 
compensate for the bombing accuracy 
needed to hit such a small building. 
Huge bomb craters circled the target. 
Hitler’s residence, considering the 
weight of bombs, fared relatively 
well. Photo reconnaissance on 26 
April showed that the Berghof was 
“not so seriously damaged” and 
only three hits were recorded. The 
attack was more effective against the 
army barracks and the surrounding 
buildings. The initial report noted that 
“there is very heavy damage to huts in 
the camp for Czech workers and in the 
settlement for evacuated children.” 
German assessments corroborate 
the first British impressions. The 
German damage report added that 
Bormann and Göring’s houses were 
destroyed, that the SS barracks 
were heavily damaged, but that the 
Berghof and Platterhof Hotel were 
only damaged.46
These two photos were taken during the RAF 
raid on Berchtesgaden on 25 April 1945. In the 
photo on the left, taken early in the raid, a large 
cloud of smoke caused by the attack is visible 
in the bottom right corner; Hitler’s Berghof is 
indicated by a black arrow. The second photo, 
taken later in the raid shows evidence of the 
damage caused by the raid including a number 
of bombs strikes directly on Hitler’s Berghof 
(see the wings of the house to the left and right 
of the white arrow.)
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 Subsequent British reports made 
greater claims. “The Lancasters 
obtained three direct hits on the 
chalet,” an Air Ministry Bulletin 
dated 27 April announced, and 
added that “both wings have been 
severely damaged.”47 An intelligence 
summary went even further:
it can be seen that the Wachenfels, the 
Fuhrer’s personal residence, suffered 
three direct hits. Part of the main 
building was destroyed, and both 
wings were very seriously damaged. 
All important buildings as well as 
numerous unidentified buildings 
in the target area were affected. The 
SS barracks suffered particularly 
heavy damage when one medium 
block was destroyed, another was 
wrecked by a direct hit, and a third 
had half of its top story blown off. 
The residence of Spahn, head of 
SS administration, was partially 
destroyed, and administration 
headquarters and air raid control 
center was smoking furiously at time 
of photography. The main control 
center for guarding Obersalzberg 
was also hit.48
 The latter report’s emphasis 
on the SS barracks, not part of the 
primary target set, deflected attention 
from the fact that the mission’s two 
main targets still stood. In any case, 
the amended damage reports do not 
really alter the overall impression 
that little of substance was achieved. 
The “Eagle’s Nest” escaped damage 
altogether. The Berghof was later 
destroyed by SS guards – who set 
light to the residence and vacated 
the area. It should also be noted 
that less spectacular results such 
as the destruction of a “settlement 
for evacuated children” vanished 
from the summary. Nor were any 
casualties mentioned.
 German civilian and military 
losses on the ground were light. 
The bunkers of Berchtesgaden 
and the Obersalzberg, as already 
noted, had been strengthened as 
An American P-47 Thunderbolt passes low over Hitler’s Berghof shortly after the end of the war when it became a popular sight-
seeing destination (dozens of US soldiers are visible among the ruins). It was one of the main targets of the 25 April raid, but it 
was not seriously damaged. Most of the damage seen below was caused by SS troops who torched the house before they left. 
Note the large bomb crater behind the house caused by the impact of a 12,000 pound Tallboy bomb.
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part of the general reaction to the 
growing intensity of the Combined 
Bomber Offensive in 1943. Martin 
Bormann had personally directed the 
construction of air raid shelters and 
had tunnel systems cut deep into the 
mountain side. These tunnels linked 
Hitler’s bunker with the military 
headquarters and the local anti-
aircraft defences and communications. 
These systems represented some 
of the most modern of the Nazi 
state. The party functionaries had 
palatial accommodations that were 
well-serviced by electrical power, 
heating and ventilation systems. 
They were even hardened against 
chemical weapons and the tunnel 
openings were protected by a series 
of machine gun nests manned by 
the SS. These bunkers and tunnel 
systems successfully protected the 
inhabitants of the Obersalzberg 
and Berchtesgaden in April 1945. 
Even though the damage to some 
of the village surface dwellings 
was extensive, the bunkers and 
tunnels – and the complex’s defensive 
capabilities – were largely intact. 
Only 31 people were killed.
 The bombing did convince those 
officials who had congregated in the 
Obersalzberg region to move deeper 
into the Austrian Tyrol. Hermann 
Göring, stripped of all his titles and 
offices by Hitler, emerged from his 
bunker a few days later, left the 
vicinity and then surrendered to 
the Americans on a country road. 
When the US 3rd Infantry Division 
entered into the Berchtesgaden 
area, they found neither defiant 
German soldiers nor Nazi officials. 
A timed bomb exploded in one of 
the municipal offices and wounded 
several American soldiers, but the 
“Alpine Redoubt” had been a myth.49
 The Allied press reports that 
followed the raid revealed another 
dimension to the bombing operation. 
Nowhere was the political nature of 
the Obersalzberg operation more 
apparent than in the headlines. “RAF 
These two photo show Hitler’s Berghof after the war. Most of the damage was caused 
by the SS Guards after the war, but at the bottom of the top photo is the crater from one 
of the Tallboy bombs dropped on 25 April. In the bottom photo, the collapsed portion of 
the wing of the building in the foreground was also caused by a bomb strike on 25 April.
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Lancasters blew to pieces Hitler’s 
Chalet at Berchtesgaden today 
with a direct hit by a 12,000-pound 
earthquake bomb,” journalists all 
over the western world celebrated, 
“and rained the mammoth bombs 
down on his ‘Eagle’s Nest’ fortress 
atop Kehlstein Mountain five miles 
from the chalet.”50 Additional articles 
with titles such as “Berchtesgaden 
Flattened” celebrated the destruction 
of a major Nazi symbol. Journalists 
emphasized the special historical role 
of the Berghof and the importance 
of its ruin. At a time when the 
Soviets engaged in fierce street 
fighting and closed in on Hitler in the 
German capital, the bombing of the 
Obersalzberg symbolized the western 
powers partnership with the Soviet in 
the final destruction of Nazism and 
its leader. Berchtesgaden, the articles 
stated, was an alternate Nazi capital 
and “the last spot over which the 
swastika will fly.”51
 Such blatant use of hyperbole 
could not disguise the fact that Hitler 
had rejected the idea of a final stand 
in the Alps. As a symbol of Allied 
victory, any euphoria caused by the 
supposed destruction of Hitler’s 
house was therefore extremely short-
lived. The raid faded from public 
memory. General Eisenhower later 
even attributed the entire bombing 
operation to the US Eight Air Force.52
 Harris himself failed to mention 
the raid in his memoirs. For obvious 
reasons, he was far more interested 
in pointing out comments by the 
Nazi Armaments Minister Albert 
Speer concerning the effectiveness 
of aerial bombing in reducing 
industrial output. Speer argued that 
the spectacular advances of Allied 
ground forces in 1944 would not have 
prevented the armaments industry 
from supplying German forces for 
over a year. A Speer memorandum 
composed in  September  1944 
speculated that the shrinking 
land mass of the Reich would not 
soon lead to serious raw materials 
shortages and that industry could still 
manufacture sufficient arms to resist 
the Allies until spring 1946.53 Air 
power, seen from this perspective, 
shortened the war by several years. 
Richard Overy points out:
There has always seemed something 
fundamentally implausible about the 
contention of bombing’s critics that 
dropping almost 2.5 million tons of 
bombs on tautly-stretched industrial 
systems and war-weary urban 
populations would not seriously 
weaken them. Germany and Japan 
had no special immunity…The final 
victory of the bombers in 1944 was, 
Speer concluded, ‘the greatest lost 
battle on the German side ...’. For 
all the arguments over the morality 
Below: This photo, taken looking south, shows the ruins of the SS Barracks, heavily 
damaged in the 25 April raid, on the right, and the Platterhof Hotel garage on the left.
Bottom: The Platterhof hotel was also significantly damaged in the air raid. After the 
war, the US Army occupied the site and after substantial repairs, the Platterhof was 
reopened as the Hotel General Walker.
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or operational effectiveness of the 
bombing campaigns, the air offensive 
was one of the decisive elements in 
Allied victory.
Even historians who downplay 
Bomber Command’s contribution, 
such as Robert Pape, point out 
that the bombers choked German 
communications and the flow of 
commodities such as oil. “From 
World War I until the 1980s,” Pape 
concludes, “[bombers] were most 
effective in support of ground power, 
serving as the ‘hammer’ to ground 
power’s ‘anvil,’ with the anvil usually 
doing most of the work.”54 It should 
be pointed out that Pape and others 
fall victim to a statistical chimera. 
Even though basic logic would 
recognize that the sheer scale of 
the bombing offensive destroyed 
any German ability to hold the line 
indefinitely,55 it is misplaced to 
count the number of tanks or guns 
actually destroyed on the battlefield 
and measure this total against those 
weapons systems neutralized by 
strategic airpower alone. The basic 
targets of strategic bombing such as 
manufactured output and especially 
morale are difficult to define and 
therefore even harder to judge.56
 The literature creates a strong 
case that the collapse of German 
communications stands as the 
strongest argument for bombing 
effectiveness. The interference with 
rail traffic during late 1944 and 
early 1945 played the greatest role 
of any of the services in quickening 
the speed of German collapse. The 
historiography is clear that the 
interdiction of communications 
restricted the flow of coal and that 
this in turn led to systemic shortfalls 
in output at essential fixed nitrogen 
installations after they had used 
up their stockpiled coal. As these 
reserves were depleted, and the Allies 
closed the ring around Germany, 
serious fuel and explosives shortages 
hampered the efforts of frontline 
German soldiers.57 These arguments 
demonstrate the decisive impact of 
both strategic and tactical bombing 
operating in a murky world between 
the strategic and operational levels of 
war. The destruction of bridges, for 
example, hurt both industry and the 
ability to move men and material to 
the front. This duality lay at the heart 
of strategic bombing doctrine and it is 
manifestly wrong to focus exclusively 
on tactical input. Such tendencies, 
it can be argued, reflexively call 
Speer’s conclusion that the targeting 
of industrial targets “caused the 
breakdown of the German armaments 
industry” into question.58
Conclusion
The suppression of German industrial output cost Bomber 
Command 44.4 percent of their airmen 
– the highest of any Allied service.59 
The bombing of the Obersalzberg 
could have represented the crowning 
achievement of Harris’ difficult and 
expensive war against Nazism. His 
policies had shortened the war by 
several years. Why, then, was Bomber 
Command robbed of a campaign 
medal and Harris denied a peerage 
after 1945? Why was the destruction 
of Hitler’s mountain retreat ignored?
 This article demonstrates that 
Harris’s dismissal of concerns about 
postwar recovery set strategic bombing 
at odds with pragmatic politicians 
like Churchill. Bomber Command’s 
attack on urban infrastructure, as 
pointed out, represented a rational 
response to the realities of modern 
armaments production. On the 
other hand, the American policy of 
“precision bombing” was premised 
on an assumption that military 
and civilian sectors were clearly 
divisible and “create[d] the illusion 
of good bombing against bad.”60 
Unlike the Americans, Harris failed 
to understand that the moral high 
ground represented a strong weapon 
in the arsenal against Nazism. He 
promoted the open presentation 
of his strategy that encouraged the 
“deliberate” devastation of civilian 
targets.61 Worse still, instead of 
standing down in April, Harris 
continued along a path that threatened 
to frustrate the future administration 
of a defeated Germany. Bomber 
Command exhibited a degree of 
“civil-military disconnect” that 
was bound to undermine positive 
perceptions of its contribution.
 Those who toured Germany 
after the war, such as the economist 
Kenneth Galbraith, wrote that 
German cities were a “sickening 
sight.”62 A British officer called 
them “Pompeiis petrified by the 
volcano of modern war.”63 American 
correspondent William Shirer, on 
visiting Nuremberg at the end of the 
war, wrote in his diary:
It is gone! The lovely medieval town 
behind the moat is utterly destroyed. 
It is a vast heap of rubble, beyond 
description, and beyond hope of 
rebuilding. As the prosaic U.S. army 
puts it, Nuremberg is ‘91 percent 
dead.’ The old town, I should say, 
the old Nuremberg of Duerer and 
Hans Sachs and the Meistersingers 
is 99 percent ‘dead.’64
 The bombing campaign was 
now interpreted as a complicating 
factor in the goal of global prosperity. 
British economic experts claimed 
in November 1945 that Bomber 
Command had returned the German 
economy “back to the beginnings of 
industrialisation” and that recovery 
would be difficult and expensive.65
While the German “Pompeiis” 
were potent symbols of strategic air 
power, they also became linked to 
postwar hardship and the long road 
to recovery. From the perspective of 
politicians such as Churchill, the final 
bombing raids of the war appeared 
counterproductive in terms of the 
coming occupation of Germany and 
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the overwhelmingly more important 
task of domestic reconstruction. 
Harris failed to realize that each 
additional raid added to mounting 
worries about the challenges of 
German reconstruction and the 
attacks were increasingly viewed 
in a negative light. Since Churchill 
had expressed real worries that were 
reflected in military decision-making 
at the highest levels, the success 
of the strategic bombing carried 
significant negative repercussions 
expressed in the postwar political 
unwillingness to openly reward the 
decisive contribution of strategic 
air power. Viewed in this way, 
the bombing of Hitler’s mountain 
worked against Bomber Command 
and vanished from the historical 
narrative.
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